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DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS? MARKET PRACTICE AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 




The 20th century witnessed a transformative, “tectonic” shift in 
international law, from “absolute” to “restrictive” theories of sovereign immunity. 
As conventionally understood, however, this dramatic transformation represented 
only a shift in the default rule. Under absolute immunity, national courts could not 
hear lawsuits and enforce judgments against a foreign sovereign without its 
consent. Under restrictive immunity, foreign sovereigns were presumptively not 
immune when they engaged in commercial acts. We demonstrate that market 
practices undermine this conventional understanding. Using an extensive, two-
century data set of contracts between foreign governments and private creditors, 
we show that contracting parties have long treated absolute immunity as akin to a 
mandatory rule, which they could not reliably change by contract. By contrast, we 
show that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in the U.S. and the State 
Immunities Act 1978 in the U.K.—two statutes largely overlooked by 
international law scholarship—fundamentally reordered a global market for 
contracts. We explore why the conventional narrative, which relies on analysis of 
traditional legal materials, is at such odds with the “law on the ground.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
The law of foreign sovereign immunity changed dramatically over the 
twentieth century. The starting point was the rule of absolute immunity. Under 
that rule, a state was immune from suit in another state’s courts (jurisdictional 
immunity) and its assets could not be seized to enforce a court judgment 
(execution immunity). Over time, this doctrine gave way to the so-called 
“restrictive” theory of immunity, under which foreign sovereigns were no longer 
immune in cases arising out of their commercial (as opposed to public, or 
governmental) acts. The shift from absolute to restrictive immunity is one of the 
most significant developments in the field of customary international law (Nagan 
and Root 2013; Verdier and Voeten 2015). It represented a great, “tectonic shift” 
(Koh 2011, p. 1143) in the willingness of national courts to enforce private claims 
against foreign governments. But despite its perceived significance, the shift is 
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conventionally understood only as a change in the default rule. Under absolute 
immunity, a creditor who wants legal enforcement rights must bargain for them 
ex ante. Under restrictive immunity, no such bargain is necessary. 
The conclusion that sovereign immunity rules are defaults emerged from a 
methodology commonly employed in studies of customary international law 
(CIL). Simply defined, CIL is “general practice accepted as law.”i In other words, 
a CIL rule exists if a sufficiently large number of states engage in a practice 
because they view it as obligatory. To identify state practice with regard to 
sovereign immunity, tribunals, practitioners, and scholars have examined the law 
on the books—i.e., the rules as articulated by legislatures, courts, and other 
government agents (Jennings and Watts 2008; Fox 2008; Whytock 2013; Verdier 
and Voeten 2015). Traditional scholarship and practice in the field of CIL thus 
treats official statements of the law—judicial opinions, statutes, etc.—as the 
central subject of inquiry. 
We adopt a different perspective. Rather than look to the law on the 
books, we examine the behavior of the actors most directly affected by the rules 
of foreign sovereign immunity: government debtors and their private creditors. 
The relationship between formal law and behavior is a central inquiry in socio-
legal studies. Among others, Macaulay (1963), Greif (1989), Ellickson (1994), 
Bernstein (1992), George et al. (2011), and Hadfield and Bozovic (2016), have 
demonstrated that private actors do not always order their affairs in accordance 
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with formal legal rules. Yet mainstream legal analysis often ignores these 
insights. This is particularly true in the field of CIL, the content of which is drawn 
almost completely from the law on the books. 
In this article, we draw on what is (to our knowledge) the most 
comprehensive dataset of contracts between private citizens and foreign 
governments. Our data consist of sovereign bonds—i.e., loan contracts sold by 
governments to investors in foreign markets. Because sovereign borrowers often 
defaulted, and because the borrower’s own courts would likely prove inhospitable 
or ineffective, foreign investors had an interest in accessing the courts of their 
home states, if the law of sovereign immunity would allow this. The dataset 
includes thousands of contracts and spans two centuries and multiple jurisdictions 
with different sovereign immunity rules, and we use it to study how loan contracts 
responded to changes in these rules. 
We review the data below, but the principal finding is this: Until the 
1970s, virtually no contract, in any jurisdiction we have identified, modified the 
background rules of sovereign immunity. Then, in the mid- to late-1970s, 
everything changed. Almost overnight, bonds issued in multiple jurisdictions 
uniformly adopted detailed clauses bestowing legal enforcement rights on 
creditors. This shift correlates almost perfectly with two statutory developments: 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) in the United States (1976) and the 
State Immunities Act 1978 (SIA) in the United Kingdom. Every prior 
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development in the law of sovereign immunity seemingly passed unnoticed. 
Prominent judicial opinions in major creditor jurisdictions; draft treaties 
purporting to codify customary international law; official proclamations of 
national policy by executive branch officials—none appear to have had any 
impact on contracts. By contrast, the FSIA and SIA had a dramatic and immediate 
effect on contracting behavior. 
This empirical picture is puzzling for two reasons. First, it is at odds with 
the traditional conception in international law scholarship of sovereign immunity 
as a default rule. Under absolute immunity, creditors had to explicitly bargain for 
court access, but they did not do so despite having economic incentives to seek 
greater legal enforcement rights. Under restrictive immunity, creditors 
presumptively had access to national courts, yet they bargained for access 
anyway. Why did express waivers of immunity begin to appear only after the shift 
to restrictive immunity, when they were no longer as necessary? Second, what 
explains the suddenness and uniformity of the change in contracting practices? 
Most scholars of international law describe the transition from absolute to 
restrictive immunity as a gradual one, taking over a century (e.g., Verdier and 
Voeten 2015; van Alebeek 2008, p. 151-52; Badr 1984, p. 57-58.) This inclines 
observers to view statutes like the FSIA as relatively minor developments that did 
little more than codify existing law (e.g., Badr 1984). In the context of our data, 
however, the gradual legal transition described by the literature on CIL seems 
6 
 
largely irrelevant. Why did these two statutes dramatically reshape the contracting 
landscape? 
This article offers preliminary answers to these questions. In the process, it 
calls into question the understanding of absolute immunity as a default rule. 
Contrary to this conventional wisdom, our findings imply that sovereign 
borrowers and private investors viewed immunity as akin to a mandatory rule.ii  
We argue that early case law developments, which commentators interpreted to 
mean that sovereign immunity could be waived by contract, were in fact tentative 
and ambiguous commitments that gave investors little assurance that courts would 
be receptive to their claims. Put another way, these early judicial pronouncements 
were not interpreted as credible commitments that courts would entertain suits 
against foreign governments. The FSIA and SIA, by contrast, may have 
represented the first credible commitments to enforce privately-negotiated 
waivers of immunity. 
Yet there is almost surely more to the story, for not all credible changes in 
the legal rule dramatically impact behavior on the ground. Thus, after re-casting 
absolute immunity as akin to a mandatory rule, we turn to the impact of the FSIA 
and SIA on contract drafting. As we explain, actors in the sovereign debt markets 
are likely to value new terms only when they believe that others share that view. 
In consequence, a new contract clause will become widespread only if market 
actors believe that others will embrace the clause. We argue that the FSIA and 
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SIA served as coordinating devices around which the lawyers, bankers, and 
finance officials developed common expectations about how to prepare sovereign 
bond documentation (e.g., McAdams 2000).  
We close by highlighting the implications of our findings—and our 
methodology—for scholarship and practice in the field of CIL. As we have noted, 
the traditional methodology for detecting CIL rules seeks to infer state practice 
from judicial opinions, legislative acts, executive proclamations, diplomatic acts 
and protests, and other public statements of the law on the books. This approach 
raises serious methodological difficulties, not the least of which is that tribunals, 
lawyers, and legal academics rarely have the resources and disciplinary training to 
investigate, interpret, and aggregate the law on the books in nearly 200 states 
(Kelly 2000; Young 2002; Petersen 2009; Choi and Gulati 2015; Scoville 2016). 
Our findings highlight another, perhaps deeper, flaw. Traditional CIL 
methodology has few tools for distinguishing law that matters—in the sense of 
impacting behavior—from law that does not. By shifting our focus to behavior on 
the ground, we highlight an alternative way to explore the development of CIL 
rules. Our approach complements traditional CIL methods and can support (or 
undermine) the conclusions those methods yield. 
THE EVOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LAW 
This section provides an overview of the evolution of foreign sovereign 
immunity law. We focus on the law on the books, and on how commentators 
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writing at the time understood that law. Put differently, we tell the story that 
results from application of traditional methods used in the study of CIL. As will 
become clear when we turn to the data, a different picture emerges from the 
behavior of actors on the ground. That fact will complicate the story we relate in 
this section. 
Because CIL rules are generalized from the practices of many states, they 
necessarily obscure differences across jurisdictions (Stephan 2010). To illustrate 
this, we give detail about the different evolutionary paths taken by the law in the 
three major financial centers for the issuance of sovereign bonds over the time 
period we examine (roughly 1810-2010): France, the U.K., and the U.S. The law 
on the books differed substantially in these jurisdictions, and these differences 
should, in theory, have produced practices with regard to contract drafting. 
The evolution from absolute to restrictive immunity 
Foreign sovereigns traditionally enjoyed absolute immunity from suit and 
from execution (Verdier and Voeten 2015). The rule was subject to exceptions. 
For example, national courts could adjudicate questions of ownership over 
immovable property located in their jurisdiction. As most commentators 
understood the law, however, a foreign sovereign could not be sued without its 




Because it is inferred from state practices in the aggregate, CIL has been 
called “the generalization of the practice of states” (Fisheries Case (U.K. v. 
Norway), 1951 I.C.J 116, 191. (J. Read)). Another way to put this is to say that 
CIL rules are imprecise. To say that a sovereign may consent to suit, for instance, 
does not indicate whether it may revoke its consent once given. By the late-19th 
century, at least some courts had indicated that consent was irrevocable. One early 
French case involved litigation against the Government of Tunis.iii The relevant 
bonds were issued through French banks and contained a clause providing that 
disputes would be adjudicated in France. The Bey of Tunis had established a 
commission to manage his financial affairs and argued that this divested the 
French courts of jurisdiction. The Civil Tribunal of the Seine rejected this 
argument, noting that the stipulation to jurisdiction could not “be nullified by the 
personal will of one of the parties” (Rochaïd-Dahdah v. Gouvernement tunisien, 
Tribunal Civil de la Seine, April 10, 1888, 15 CLUNET 670 (1888) (Fr.)). Taken at 
face value, this appears to be an early, unequivocal articulation of the view that 
absolute immunity was a presumption that could be trumped by contract. 
Writing in the 1930s, Eleanor Wyllys Allen undertook a cross-
jurisdictional survey of the law of foreign sovereign immunity. She discussed the 
Tunisian decision and other cases, noting what had become the “usual view” that 
a sovereign could renounce its immunity by contract (1933, p. 19-20). She 
preferred the approach taken by English courts, which required the sovereign to 
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consent at the time of the suit, but conceded that the law was to the contrary. 
Others shared this assessment. A contemporaneous proposal to codify the rules of 
international law on the subject (“the Harvard Project”) asserted that a foreign 
government lost its immunity from suit when it had “previously consented to the 
institution of such a proceeding.” The accompanying comments explained that the 
rule was “so obviously equitable that its general acceptability may be assumed” 
(Harvard Research 1932, 549).iv After canvassing the law of multiple 
jurisdictions, the authors dismissed English practice as the only exception to the 
rule. 
The rule regarding waiver of execution immunity was less well-
established. Allen noted rare occasions on which a foreign state was “held to have 
submitted even to execution against its property,” without suggesting that these 
episodes represented shocking departures from settled law (1933, p. 49, 68). By 
later in the century, there was additional authority for the proposition that a 
sovereign could waive execution immunity, as long as it did so expressly. A 
report prepared in 1949 to inform State Department deliberations on whether to 
adopt restrictive immunity (“the Snow Report”) characterized French law as 
receptive to such waivers, citing a case from 1938. The general belief, however, 
was that states probably would not waive their execution immunity. Thus, the 
authors of the Harvard Project (1932, 707) did not propose a rule on the subject. 
The comments to the proposed convention characterized such a rule as 
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“unnecessary” but did not suggest that it would be inappropriate to recognize a 
waiver of execution immunity if a sovereign had agreed to one. 
The exceptions to immunity discussed thus far all involve waiver. 
Increasingly, however, courts manufactured other exceptions. By the 1950s, these 
accrued to the point that prominent commentators expressed skepticism that 
absolute immunity had ever been so widely practiced as to constitute a rule of CIL 
(Lauterpacht 1951). Courts had begun to distinguish acts jure imperii (i.e., in the 
sovereign’s public or governmental capacity) from those taken jure gestionis (in a 
private, civil, or commercial capacity). Sovereigns retained their traditional 
immunity in the former category, but not the latter. This distinction became the 
backbone of the theory of restrictive immunity. Over the latter half of the 
twentieth century, states increasingly adopted the restrictive theory (Verdier and 
Voeten 2015, 12). The transition from absolute to restrictive immunity was 
primarily the work of national courts, although the rules were eventually codified 
in the U.S. (in the FSIA), the U.K. (in the SIA), and several other countries 
(Damrosch 2011, p. 1192). 
After a country adopted restrictive immunity, a foreign sovereign could be 
sued for its commercial activities whether or not it consented to the suit. But the 
boundaries of “commercial” activity were contested. Our data, for example, 
consist of sovereign bonds. Early statements of the restrictive immunity rule often 
preserved the sovereign’s jurisdictional immunity in cases involving “public debt” 
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(e.g., Westlake 1910; Harvard Project 1932). Thus, it remained uncertain whether 
the switch to restrictive immunity would benefit investors in sovereign bonds. If 
incurring debt was a governmental rather than a commercial act, a bond investor 
could sue only if the bond contained (and the court enforced) a waiver of 
jurisdictional immunity. Moreover, even in jurisdictions that had embraced 
restrictive immunity with respect to questions of jurisdiction, sovereigns might 
retain execution immunity with respect to some or all assets. Thus, all creditors of 
a sovereign—not just those holding claims arising from “public debt”—had 
reason to prefer contracts that included waivers of execution immunity. 
One international “custom,” but varied state practice 
As noted, the conventional understanding of the evolution of sovereign 
immunity law obscures important differences across jurisdictions. Here, we 
explain how the law evolved in the three most important jurisdictions for the 
issuance of sovereign debt: France, the U.K., and the U.S. 
France: By relatively early in the 19th century, the London Stock 
Exchange had become the world’s primary market for the issuance of sovereign 
debt (Neal and Davis 2006), with the Paris Bourse playing a secondary role. By 
the early 1900s, the Paris market had further declined in significance. Still, for 
another several decades Paris remained an important market for Russia, China, 
Romania and other borrowers (e.g., Lavelle 2004, 35). During the period in which 
Paris was an important global market, the French law of sovereign immunity 
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appeared to evolve in significant ways. Although a civil law jurisdiction, French 
courts played the dominant role in this apparent evolution (Dellapenna 1992, 55). 
With regard to jurisdictional immunity, we have noted that, in 1888, a 
French court refused to allow the Bey of Tunis to revoke consent to be sued in 
French courts. From this case, and a few later ones, Eleanor Wyllys Allen and 
other authoritative commenters confidently inferred that French law treated 
contractual waivers of immunity as irrevocable (Allen 1932, 168; Harvard Project 
1932, 551-53). 
The law developed more slowly with regard to execution immunity. Yet if 
French law treated jurisdictional immunity as a default rule, it is not clear why it 
would adopt a different approach to execution immunity. And in fact, early cases 
implied that a foreign sovereign could waive both immunities. For example, 
courts took pains to clarify that a generic waiver of immunity would be construed 
to refer only to immunity from suit—an unnecessary clarification if execution 
immunity could not be waived at all (e.g., Veuve Caratier-Terrasson c. Direction 
générale des Chemins de fer d’Alsace-Lorraine (May 5, 1885)). Later 
commentators agreed. Describing French practice in 1949, the Snow Report 
unequivocally proclaimed that French courts enforced express contractual waivers 
of execution immunity, citing only one 1938 case. If that understanding of French 
law was correct, we would expect to see waivers of one or both types of immunity 
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by the first decades of the twentieth century, if not significantly before, in bonds 
issued in France. (We do not.) 
The United Kingdom: The London Stock Exchange was the world’s 
preeminent financial market by the early 19th century, and sovereign bonds began 
to be issued in large numbers after around 1820 (Lipson 1985). Most accounts 
trace the adoption of restrictive immunity to the enactment of the SIA in 1978. 
Until the SIA, moreover, it was very much in doubt whether a sovereign could 
irrevocably waive its immunity by contract. As noted, several English cases 
required the sovereign to consent at the time of the lawsuit, even if it had 
previously agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of English courts (e.g., Duff Dev. 
Co. v. Kelantan, [1924] A.C. 797 (H.L.); Kahan v. Pakistan Fed’n, [1951] 2 K.B. 
1003, 1012). 
The SIA changed these rules. The statute denies immunity from suit in 
cases where the sovereign has engaged in commercial activity and clarifies that 
this includes “any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance.” This 
makes a waiver of jurisdictional immunity of little value, for the default rule is 
that sovereigns may be sued in debt cases. The SIA also authorizes execution 
against a foreign sovereign’s commercial assets (subject to certain conditions). 
However, a contractual waiver of execution immunity offers additional value by 
potentially expanding the pool of assets subject to execution.v 
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United States: The story is more complicated in the U.S., which became a 
major global capital market after World War I. Most accounts trace the adoption 
of restrictive immunity to 1952, when the Department of State (in the so-called 
Tate Letter) announced that it would abandon absolute immunity as a matter of 
executive branch policy. But the Tate Letter’s impact was complicated, and there 
were other noteworthy developments both before and after 1952. For our 
purposes, the important point is that pre-FSIA law left unclear whether a 
sovereign could irrevocably waive jurisdictional immunity, execution immunity, 
or both. Nevertheless, some prominent commentators, employing traditional 
methods of identifying state practice, believed that courts would sometimes 
enforce immunity waivers. 
The Tate Letter signaled the formal U.S. embrace of restrictive immunity 
(Bradley and Helfer 2010; Dellapenna 2011), but it did not clarify the rights of 
investors in sovereign bonds. For one thing, the Tate Letter addressed only 
jurisdictional immunity and did not alter background rules concerning execution 
immunity. The Tate Letter also left unclear whether the issuance of bonds was a 
commercial activity; that question was not answered until 1992 (Weltover v. 
Republic of Argentina, 504 U.S. 607 (1992)) If issuing bonds was a public rather 
than commercial act, foreign governments would remain immune from suit 
notwithstanding the switch to restrictive immunity. Finally, the Tate Letter did not 
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clarify whether a foreign sovereign could irrevocably waive whatever immunities 
it retained. 
These uncertainties were compounded by a quirk of U.S. practice. 
Although courts initially played a key role in shaping immunity doctrine, by the 
1930s the executive branch had assumed primary responsibility for immunity 
determinations. A foreign state that wanted to claim immunity would often 
request a suggestion of immunity from the Department of State. If the Department 
recognized and allowed the suggestion, its decision was effectively final, ending 
litigation in U.S. courts (Weisburd 1988; White 1999; Bradley and Helfer 2010). 
But if the Department declined to support the claim to immunity, the court would 
have to decide the question on its own. 
This two-tier system makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about pre-
FSIA practice with regard to waivers of immunity. The view that U.S. law 
allowed a sovereign to revoke its waiver (e.g., Ku 2014, p. 43) derives some 
support from case law (e.g., Beers v. State of Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527 (1857)), and 
from public assertions by the Department of State. In a 1961 case, Rich v. Naviera 
Vacuba, the Department asserted that a waiver of immunity “may be revoked at 
will—at least prior to the time suit is actually brought to enforce the waiver.” 
(Memorandum for the United States [In Opposition to Application for Stay of 
Mayan Lines, S.A.], 1 I.L.M. 276, 297 (1961)).  
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But matters were not so clear, and surveys of international and U.S. 
practice before and after Rich reached the opposite conclusion. The Snow Report 
(1949), like the Harvard Project (1932) before it, concluded that a waiver of 
immunity was enforceable under international law, and neither listed U.S. practice 
as in conflict with this rule. Early drafts of the Restatement of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States, published in 1958, also asserted that a 
sovereign could waive immunity “in advance of any enforcement action.” 
Likewise, a policy research study prepared in 1963 for the Department of State 
(Sweeney 1963) identified the United Kingdom as the only jurisdiction where a 
sovereign could revoke its consent to be sued. There was, finally, reason to doubt 
the Department would consistently intervene on behalf of sovereigns that had 
agreed to waive immunity, as it had in Rich. That intervention was widely viewed 
as motivated by political rather than legal factors (e.g., Cardozo 1963, 466-67). 
Indeed, less than a decade later the Department reversed course, acknowledging 
that it “accept[ed] the principle” that a sovereign could irrevocably waive 
immunity by contract (Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Department of State 
1977, 1065-66). 
Two conclusions emerge from this murky legal landscape. First, it is easy, 
using traditional methods for identifying state practice, to conclude that U.S. law 
was receptive to waivers of sovereign immunity by 1950 or 1960, if not before. A 
number of prominent commentators made precisely this inference. To be sure, the 
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Department of State might take a contrary position in support of a foreign 
sovereign’s claim to immunity, and in that event a court would likely defer to the 
Department (e.g., Weisburd 1988; Bradley and Helfer 2010). But in other cases, 
courts would independently decide whether to enforce a waiver of immunity (e.g., 
In the Matter of the United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264 (1944); 
Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 
336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964)). If this is the correct understanding of U.S. practice, 
a second conclusion follows. Well before the FSIA’s enactment in 1976, private 
creditors had reason to prefer contracts with clauses that expressly waived the 
sovereign’s immunities from jurisdiction and execution. (This assumes creditors 
had reason to value legal enforcement—a subject we address below.) 
Although the FSIA clarified much about the U.S. law of sovereign 
immunity, it left questions unanswered. The statute codified the restrictive 
immunity doctrine but left unclear whether sovereign borrowing constituted 
commercial activity (Weidemaier 2014). To that extent, the FSIA merely restated 
practice as it had been since the Tate Letter. The statute, however, removed the 
State Department from the picture by transferring immunity decisions to the 
courts. The statute also made clear that a foreign sovereign could not revoke its 
waiver of jurisdictional or execution immunity. As with the SIA in the United 
Kingdom, the FSIA granted creditors limited execution rights and allowed 
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creditors contract for greater rights by negotiating an expansive waiver of 
execution immunity. 
Preliminary hypotheses 
In sum, the law of foreign sovereign immunity followed different 
evolutionary paths in these three countries. Figure 1 summarizes these paths, 
focusing on the eras of primary relevance.vi The figure does not capture all 
relevant developments, in particular those affecting the sovereign’s immunity 
from execution. Nevertheless, it captures the most pertinent differences in the 
three countries.  
[Insert Figure 1] 
If creditors were attuned to these developments and wanted to add legal 
sanctions to the enforcement mix, we would expect different contracting practices 
to have evolved in each jurisdiction.vii  In particular, we can make the following 
predictions: 
1. In France, waivers of jurisdictional immunity should have begun to 
appear by the late 19th century, and waivers of execution 
immunity not long thereafter. Bonds issued after the transition to 
restrictive immunity would continue to include waivers, both to 
remove uncertainty about whether bond issuance was a 
commercial act (e.g., Lauterpacht 1951, p. 262) and to make a 
wider range of assets subject to execution. 
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2. In the United Kingdom, as compared to France, waivers of 
jurisdictional immunity arguably should not appear at all. Pre-SIA 
law treated these as revocable; by clarifying that government 
borrowing was a commercial activity, the statute made them 
unnecessary. Post-SIA, however, a creditor probably would have 
valued a waiver of execution immunity, which could no longer be 
revoked and expanded the pool of assets subject to seizure. 
3. In the United States, at any point in the 20th century, waivers of 
jurisdictional and execution immunity might have been enforced in 
at least some cases, although the likelihood of enforcement 
increased over time. The FSIA might have diminished their 
importance slightly, but not by much, since both types of waiver 
continued to have a purpose even after the statute. By the early 
1990s, however, waivers of jurisdictional immunity would no 
longer serve much function, as it had become clear that sovereigns 
lacked jurisdictional immunity in cases arising out of bond debt.  
These predictions assume that the law on the books impacts the behavior of actors 
on the ground. On that assumption, our central prediction is that contracting 
practices should vary both in time and across the key jurisdictions. In the next 
section, we examine how this prediction holds up against the data. 
HOW CONTRACTS RESPONDED 
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Contract law scholarship generally pays little attention to how and why 
contracts change (Richman 2011; Choi et al., 2013). The assumption is that each 
contract is negotiated from scratch to allocate the transactional surplus. Yet this 
assumption is incompatible with the experience of practicing lawyers, who 
typically start with a template and make changes only as necessary to 
accommodate the present transaction (e.g., Weidemaier et al. 2013). This 
reality—in which contracts are “sticky” but do change—brings different questions 
to the fore. One is how legal change impacts the contract template. In our context, 
the question is especially interesting, for the changes affect the law’s relevance 
more than its content. When legal actors in a country declare that they will treat 
sovereign immunity as a default rule rather than a mandatory one, they invite 
private citizens and foreign governments to bring their disputes out of the domain 
of politics and into the domain of law. Our data offers a window into how 
contracts responded to this invitation. 
The data 
A typical sovereign bond issue includes multiple documents, prepared by 
the issuing government, the financial institutions that manage the issue, and the 
lawyers. These include some or all of the following: (1) a contract between the 
government and its financial intermediaries; (2) a trust indenture, if the bond calls 
for a trustee to represent bondholders; (3) the bond itself, governing the 
relationship between the government and its bondholders; and (4) a prospectus or 
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other sales document distributed to investors before the bond issue. Sales 
documents typically describe or reprint the terms that will appear in the bond.  
Conceptually, the dataset has two parts, distinguished by date and by our 
method of data collection. The first part includes bonds issued between roughly 
1820 and 1980. Modern electronic databases do not include most of these bonds, 
nor is there a comprehensive paper archive. Many government borrowers, 
however, chose to list bonds on a stock exchange, and exchange archives often 
include the bonds or related sales documents. London was the dominant exchange 
until around World War I; New York took its place after the war. We visited the 
archives for the New York Stock Exchange (at the Library of Congress) and the 
London Stock Exchange (Guildhall) and took digital images of sales documents. 
This method of collection left gaps. For instance, some bonds were listed 
only on other exchanges (such as Amsterdam and Paris); others were not listed on 
any exchange. Important terms also might have appeared in the loan contract 
between the government and the underwriting banks, most of which have been 
destroyed or are housed in inaccessible bank archives. Nevertheless, some 
prominent bank archives are open to researchers. We visited the Rothschild 
Archives, the JP Morgan archives at the JP Morgan Library and Museum, and the 
archives for Barings, UBS, and HSBC banks. We also visited other collections of 
sovereign bonds and sales documents, as well as some collections of personal 
papers from prominent bankers, at the Harvard Business School library, the 
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British Museum, the Origins of Value Museum at Yale University, Cornell 
University, Duke University, Columbia University and the Museum of Historical 
Shares and Bonds (Museum Wertpapierwelt). 
The second and larger part of the dataset consists of documents gathered 
from public databases, which provide fairly comprehensive data on sovereign 
bonds from around 1980. We used Thomson One Banker and Perfect Information. 
Our data includes 1906 bonds issued between 1822 and the present.viii Because 
London and New York were the primary markets for sovereign bonds during this 
period, most of our bonds come from these markets. However, the dataset also 
includes bonds issued in the German, French, Dutch, and other markets. 
Our dataset spans two primary eras of sovereign bond lending. The first 
lasted from the early to mid-1800s through the Great Depression. The second 
began around 1990 and continues today. Between these eras, sovereign bond 
markets were relatively dormant (Cassis 2006, 192-93). Sovereign borrowing 
primarily took the form of direct loans from multilateral institutions such as the 
World Bank or from commercial bank syndicates (Fisch and Gentile 2004, 1054-
55). As Figure 2 shows, the distribution of bonds in our dataset reflects this 
history. Figure 2 also reveals that, while we have located a substantial number of 
bonds from the first era of sovereign bond lending, most were issued in the early 
1900s. Sovereign bonds from the 1800s are somewhat under-represented.  
[Insert Figure 2.] 
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We believe this is the most comprehensive dataset of bond terms, but there 
remain gaps in the data. The most notable relates to the Paris Bourse, which, 
despite its relative insignificance by the early 20th century, remained a key 
market for a number of sovereign issuers (Lavelle 2004, p. 35). We gathered data 
on the Paris market from three sources. First, the British Museum has a large 
collection of bonds, including many issued in Paris. Second, many bonds were 
listed on multiple exchanges (e.g., one tranche of the loan in London and another 
in Paris). Our visits to the NYSE and the LSE captured many such issues, and the 
bond documentation usually included the terms applicable in all markets. We also 
either purchased or copied a large number of bonds issued in Paris from specialty 
shops in the bourse area catering to collectors of old securities. Through these 
methods, we were able to gather 126 bonds issued by foreign sovereigns in the 
Paris market.ix We cannot be sure that the sample is representative of the broader 
Paris market but, given the consistency of our data, we do not view this as a 
serious limitation. 
The late-1970s shift in the contract template 
Coding encompassed a number of clauses that address legal enforcement. 
This includes express waivers of jurisdictional immunity or clauses consenting to 
the jurisdiction of foreign courts. (For simplicity, we refer to these collectively as 




Finland will irrevocably waive any immunity from jurisdiction to 
which it might otherwise be entitled in any action arising out of or 
based on the Bonds which may be instituted by any holder of a 
Bond in any State or Federal court in New York City or in any 
competent court in Finland.x 
We also coded for express waivers of execution immunity,xi and for the a variety 
of other clauses that remove technical hurdles, such as service of process, that 
impede creditor litigation against foreign sovereigns. 
We find that, virtually without exception, bonds did not waive sovereign 
immunity or address any other aspect of legal enforcement until the FSIA and 
SIA had been introduced and enactment was imminent. After enactment, the 
market turned on a dime. Whereas virtually no bond, in any market, included a 
waiver of sovereign immunity before the passage of these two domestic statutes, 
almost every bond issued post-FSIA (in the New York market) or post-SIA (in the 
English market) waived the issuing government’s jurisdictional immunity. Figure 
3 depicts this shift across all markets.xii 
[Insert Figure 3.] 
With one exception—five series of bonds issued simultaneously by 
Malaysia in 1965—there are no waivers of jurisdictional immunity in our data 
until 1975. In that year, Norway issued bonds in the New York market with 
clauses waiving jurisdictional immunity and submitting to the jurisdiction of New 
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York courts. By this time, the FSIA was well on its way to enactment.xiii Waivers 
of jurisdictional immunity quickly became commonplace in the New York 
market. A nearly identical transition occurred in the English market beginning in 
1977. 
An equally dramatic, though less uniform, shift occurred with regard to 
waivers of execution immunity. In our data, the first government to make such a 
waiver was Panama, in a 1977 issuance of bonds governed by English law. 
Thereafter, virtually all bonds issued in the English market included a waiver of 
the foreign sovereign’s execution immunity (94%). The transition occurred a bit 
more slowly in the New York market, where waivers of execution immunity 
remained rare through the 1980s. But after 1995, waivers of execution immunity 
became relatively commonplace (72.8%) in bonds governed by New York law. 
Figure 4 depicts the shift across the entire dataset. 
[Insert Figure 4.] 
These patterns are hard to square with the conventional understanding of 
how sovereign immunity law evolved. Again, that understanding treats the switch 
from absolute to restrictive immunity as a change in the default rule. But if that 
were so, we would expect waivers of jurisdictional immunity to be common 
during the era of absolute immunity and less common thereafter (as states 
increasingly began to view bond issuance as commercial rather than governmental 
activity). Our data demonstrate the opposite pattern. As for the prevalence of 
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clauses waiving execution immunity, we would not necessarily expect the switch 
to restrictive immunity to have an impact. That is because, even under restrictive 
immunity, such waivers can expand the range of property subject to execution. 
But neither would we expect waivers to appear only after the switch to restrictive 
immunity. And there is another puzzle: As conventionally understood, the FSIA 
and SIA were relatively minor developments in the evolution of sovereign 
immunity law. If that is so, why did they have such a dramatic impact on market 
practice? 
Before turning to these questions, we offer four caveats. First, we 
acknowledge that there are a few reported cases from the 1800s and early 1900s 
that involve bond debt, some arguably involving waivers of sovereign immunity. 
Indeed, these cases contributed to the views expressed by the authors of the 
Harvard Project (1932, 551-52) and similar efforts to identify international 
custom regarding sovereign immunity. To take one example, in a 1922 case, a 
French court asserted jurisdiction over the Department of Antioqua (Columbia) in 
a case involving bond debt. The report of that case recounts how the government 
had appointed an individual to represent it in any “judicial controversy or 
question” arising out of the loan (Crédit Foncier d’Algerie et de Tunisie c. 
Département d’Antioquia (Trib. civ., Seine, 1922)). Our dataset does not include 
the bonds at issue in this case, although no similar language appears in any of the 
bonds we do have. Moreover, even for bonds in our dataset, it is possible that the 
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issuing government might renounce its immunity by statute or in some other 
public act. Although most bonds and their related disclosure documents reprint 
laws deemed of interest to bondholders, we cannot detect when the disclosure 
documents omit relevant information. 
These exceptions, however, do not materially alter the picture that 
emerges from our data. The number of reported “waiver” cases involving 
sovereign bond debt is tiny and must be contrasted with the uniformity of our 
data. For example, our dataset includes 111 bonds issued before 1940 in the 
French market. Not one includes a clause appointing someone to represent the 
issuing government in any litigation relating to the debt. Nor do any include a 
clause referencing sovereign immunity or agreeing to submit to the jurisdiction of 
foreign courts. Indeed, we have found no reported case involving such an express 
waiver of immunity. At most, these reported cases reveal that some bonds issued 
in the first era of bond lending included language that a court might construe to 
waive sovereign immunity. These reported cases do not indicate that such clauses 
were common; indeed, our data suggest that they were very unusual. 
A second caveat relates to bilateral or multilateral treaties that include a 
waiver of sovereign immunity. As a historical matter, there are numerous 
examples of treaties in which governments agreed to allow a treaty partner’s 
citizens to bring suit in the treaty partner’s domestic courts. In the 1930s, for 
example, the Soviet Union entered bilateral treaties with France, Germany, and 
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other countries which allowed investors from these countries to bring suit against 
the Soviet Union in the courts of the investor’s home state (although such treaties 
rarely encompassed claims arising out of bond debt.) Likewise, throughout the 
19th and much of the 20th centuries, countries used the so-called treaty of 
friendship, commerce, and navigation to procure certain rights for citizens living 
in other countries (Coyle 2013). These bilateral treaties often addressed the 
subject of legal enforcement, although typically by giving citizens access to courts 
in the host state (or, later, arbitration). 
This history supports the view that, as a matter of customary international 
law, sovereign immunity could indeed be waived by treaty. To that extent, the 
customary narrative about the evolution of sovereign immunity law is on solid 
footing. But this does not mean that national courts also recognized a waiver of 
immunity in a contract negotiated by a private creditor. That rule of international 
law—so readily embraced by the Harvard Project and similar surveys of state 
practice—is hard to square with our data. And one can see why state practice 
might distinguish between the two kinds of waiver. Litigation that results from a 
treaty-based waiver of immunity is not likely to cause serious diplomatic concerns 
for the court’s home state. After all, political actors in that state agreed to the 
treaty. To recognize contractual waivers of immunity, by contrast, is to give a 
private creditor the right to haul foreign governments into national courts, 
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whatever the impact this might have on diplomatic relations between the court’s 
home state and the foreign sovereign. 
Third, there is anecdotal evidence that waivers of sovereign immunity 
began to appear somewhat earlier in direct loan contracts between governments 
and commercial banks. Writing in 1967, Georges Delaume provided several 
examples, one from as early as 1945 (Delaume 1967, 170-72), and asserted 
without further support that direct loan contracts routinely included such 
clauses.xiv If his claim was correct, sovereign immunity waivers may have become 
commonplace in direct loan documents a bit earlier than in sovereign bonds.xv By 
and large, however, the contracting practices described by Delaume are consistent 
with our data. In particular, even direct loans did not embrace waivers of 
sovereign immunity until well after such waivers had ostensibly become 
enforceable in many of the relevant jurisdictions. 
The fourth caveat relates to arbitration. For more than a century, 
international courts and tribunals have occasionally presided over claims arising 
from sovereign debt obligations (Waibel 2013). In many of these cases, the 
tribunal acquired jurisdiction through treaty or executive agreement, rather than 
because the loan contract provided for arbitration (e.g., Wuerth 2003, p. 26-27 
and n.176). But a handful of bonds in our dataset do include clauses providing for 
arbitration of debt-related disputes. Focusing on the period before 1945, only four 
of 534 bonds include such an arbitration clause. These bonds, however, share 
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certain features with treaty-based waivers of immunity. In particular, the relevant 
loans involved the participation of other sovereign governments as potential 
creditors—for example, as guarantors of the loan. In such cases, the evidence 
suggest that creditor governments were involved in negotiating loan terms.xvi 
EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STATUTES 
With the caveats noted above, our data paint a picture at odds with the 
stylized hypotheses we set out earlier. Instead of a slow legal evolution—the story 
of the law on the books—we see a sudden shift in contracting practices. 
Moreover, although the law of sovereign immunity law developed differently 
across jurisdictions, contracts do not reflect these differences. To the contrary, 
most legal developments had no effect on contracts, including early judicial 
decisions that led Eleanor Wyllys Allen and other commentators to conclude that 
a sovereign could irrevocably waive its immunity in a contract. By contrast, and 
measured by the impact on contracts, the FSIA and SIA appear by far the most 
important developments in the century-plus evolution of sovereign immunity law. 
In the sections to follow, we explore the implications of these findings. 
Absolute immunity as a mandatory rule 
We begin by reconsidering the conventional wisdom that absolute 
immunity was a default rule. Our data is more consistent with the view that 
immunity could not be waived, or at least that investors had significant doubt as 
to the enforceability of contractual waivers of immunity. If that is correct, then it 
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would be more accurate to characterize absolute immunity as a mandatory rule—
or, at least, an extraordinarily ‘sticky’ default. 
To begin making this case, it may help to consider why an investor 
contemplating the purchase of foreign government bonds might care about legal 
enforcement rights. With few exceptions (e.g., Schumacher et al. 2014; Bulow 
and Rogoff 1989), the economics and political science literature assumes that, 
even in the modern era, legal enforcement plays little role in the sovereign debt 
markets (e.g., Panizza et al. 2009). The logic behind this view is that court 
judgments only matter when backed by threat of asset seizure, but foreign 
governments can easily keep assets safe within their borders. 
We share this skepticism to a degree, but we also think it understates the 
modern and historic importance of legal enforcement (Weidemaier and Gulati 
2015). Market participants and policymakers have long treated legal enforcement 
as a relevant concern, although not a primary one. For instance, even during the 
era of absolute immunity, creditors who had not bargained for a waiver of 
immunity sometimes tried to assert their claims in the courts (Allen 1933, 166). 
Recall, moreover, that when negotiating treaties, countries often obtained a 
waiver of immunity to protect their citizens’ foreign investments. It is hard to see 
why they would bother doing so if domestic constituents did not value legal 
enforcement. It is also hard to explain early efforts to reform the sovereign debt 
markets, which sometimes emphasized the potentially-disruptive effect of 
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litigation. For example, a 1930s initiative sponsored by the League of Nations 
proposed reforming bond contracts to prevent “too small a number of bondholders 
from attempting to institute legal proceedings when the common interests of the 
bondholders are not really involved” (Committee for the Study of International 
Loans 1939, 33). Such initiatives suggest that legal enforcement is (and was) at 
least peripherally relevant. 
If a creditor wants to sue a foreign government, it will prefer to do so in 
the courts of its home state. This means, at minimum, that those courts must be 
willing to deny the sovereign’s claim to jurisdictional immunity and to enter a 
judgment for the amount due. Having obtained such a judgment, the creditor 
might find its position materially improved even if the sovereign retained 
execution immunity. The government might pay the judgment voluntarily, or 
political officials in the creditor’s home state might view a court judgment as a 
basis for diplomatic intervention (Lauterpacht 1951, p. 222).xvii If the sovereign 
also loses its execution immunity, the creditor’s position will be improved further. 
To be sure, the creditor is not likely to seize any assets, for the sovereign can 
shelter them within its borders. To do this, however, the sovereign must forego 
putting its assets to more productive use. For example, it cannot buy commercial 
goods or borrow money in a jurisdiction where creditors might seize the goods or 
the loan proceeds (Schumacher et al. 2014; Cruces and Trebesch 2013; Shleifer 
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2003). The cost of these foregone opportunities might induce the sovereign to pay 
(Weidemaier and Gelpern 2014). 
For these reasons, investors may have had an economic incentive to favor 
loan contracts that enhanced access to legal enforcement. In turn, sovereign 
borrowers should have been willing to confer such rights the hope of lowering 
borrowing costs. This is a familiar pattern in which borrowers cede aspects of 
their sovereignty to provide assurances of repayment. In the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, for example, many borrowers ceded control over ports and other 
revenue-collection points to agents appointed by lenders or their home states  
(Ahmed et al. 2010; Pérez, Jr. and Weissman 2006; Mitchener and Weidenmier 
2005a; Mitchener and Weidenmier 2005b).xviii If investors valued enforcement 
rights, there is no reason why governments accustomed to onerous contract terms 
would draw the line at clauses waiving sovereign immunity—if, that is, courts 
would predictably give such clauses effect. 
But our data are more consistent with a world in which courts were 
reluctant to enforce privately-negotiated immunity waivers until relatively late in 
the 20th century. To begin with, note that our data represents a form of state 
practice, albeit one overlooked by traditional CIL methods. We refer to the 
practice of waiving immunity, or declining to waive immunity, when contracting 
with private creditor. When sovereigns and their creditors have economic 
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incentives to negotiate immunity waivers but do not do so, this implies that they 
view immunity as non-waivable.  
We do not place too much weight on this argument, for there are other 
plausible interpretations of the data. After all, a state may refuse to waive its 
immunity but concede that national courts may give effect to a waiver when 
made. But given the plausible economic benefits of waiving immunity—and the 
historical fact that loan contracts often required borrowers to relinquish other 
aspects of sovereignty—the fact that our data includes no waivers leads us to 
question the conventional wisdom. 
Seeking further insight, we reviewed many of the early legal 
developments that led commentators to treat sovereign immunity as a default rule 
(e.g., Harvard Project 1932; Allen 1933; Snow 1949). Even a cursory review 
prompted speculation that these early developments—though of great interest to 
scholars and policymakers—did little to dispel investor doubts that courts would 
predictably enforce contractual immunity waivers. Unlike the FSIA and SIA, 
early inroads into sovereign immunity gave legal actors significant discretion in 
how to deploy the rules. As a practical matter, this often worked in the favor of 
preserving a foreign sovereign’s claim to immunity. We have already noted one 
example. During the period when the Department of State was primarily 
responsible for making immunity determinations in the United States (roughly 
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1935-1975), observers believed it to be influenced primarily by foreign policy 
considerations rather than the law of sovereign immunity (e.g., Leigh 1969).xix  
Other jurisdictions offer similar examples. With regard to jurisdictional 
immunity, for instance, the rule on the European continent was ostensibly clear 
and unqualified: A foreign sovereign could be sued when it had waived its 
immunity by contract (Harvard Project 1932; Cohn 1958, 264-65; Delaume 1967, 
159-60). Looking more closely at the cases underpinning this rule, however, 
reveals that courts sometimes hesitated to intervene in lawsuits against foreign 
governments. For example, a court might embrace a debatable application of 
contract law to deny effect to a waiver of immunity. One 1920 Czech case 
dismissed a lawsuit notwithstanding the submission-to-jurisdiction clause in the 
creditor’s contract with the Austrian State Railways. In the court’s view, the 
disruption associated with the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, 
which coincided with contract formation, meant that railway officials might not 
have noticed the clause. The case illustrates one of the methodological problems 
in attempts to identify CIL rules: When trying to infer state practice from judicial 
opinions, it is tempting to focus on what the court says rather than on what it does. 
Thus, neither the Harvard Project (1932) nor the Snow Report (1949) allow the 
Czech case to undermine the conclusion that sovereign immunity waivers were 




With regard to execution immunity, creditors may have been even more 
dubious that courts and other official actors would vigorously enforce their rights. 
As noted, the law on the books was less clear here, but a case could be made that 
a sovereign could waive execution immunity by the early to mid-twentieth 
century. Yet creditors had reason to doubt that this would be mirrored in actual 
practice. Courts often deployed presumptions—such as the presumption that a 
sovereign’s generic waiver of immunity extended only to jurisdictional 
immunity—that prevented creditors from seizing sovereign assets. (The 
presumption remains the law today.) To seize sovereign assets, a creditor also had 
to enlist the participation of other government officials. In some cases, seizure 
required the express approval of local officials, which was not always 
forthcoming (Delaume 1967, 205). 
This background may help explain the pattern observed in our data. Take 
the question of why bonds issued to French investors did not include waivers of 
jurisdictional immunity. Although the law on the books authorized such waivers, 
creditors may have been skeptical that French courts would reliably assume 
jurisdiction over lawsuits against foreign governments. Moreover, unless the 
sovereign’s failure to pay a judgment would have reputational or diplomatic 
repercussions, the creditor would also need to get around the sovereign’s 
execution immunity. Here, French law was less clear, but French courts had 
demonstrated little interest in facilitating the seizure of foreign government assets 
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(Allen 1932, 181-85). Given this reluctance, and the fact that creditors could not 
have credibly threatened to seize sovereign assets without the assistance of other 
government officials, it is perhaps unsurprising that contracting practices in 
France match those in the United Kingdom, where the law on the books treated 
waivers as irrevocable. 
The same may be true of contracts in the U.S. market. By 1952, the U.S. 
had embraced restrictive immunity with regard to jurisdictional immunity. Even if 
debt issuance constituted a governmental rather than commercial activity, there 
was increasing support for the proposition that a sovereign could irrevocably 
waive both jurisdictional and execution immunity. Yet until 1976, the Department 
of State was primarily responsible for implementing these rules, and common 
wisdom was that it based decisions on political rather than legal considerations 
(Whytock and Chilton 2015). Especially between 1961 and 1970—the window 
between the Department’s assertion that a sovereign could revoke its waiver of 
immunity (in Rich) and its subsequent embrace of a contrary rule—creditors may 
have doubted of the value of legal enforcement. True, prominent legal authorities 
asserted that U.S. law would not allow revocation of an immunity waiver. But 
these were even less authoritative statements of the law than in France, where 
early cases had articulated the rule in the context of an actual dispute. 
To be clear, we are not saying that the SIA and FSIA radically improved 
the position of creditors. As noted elsewhere, the FSIA’s practical impact appears 
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to have been modest (Weidemaier 2014). If the foregoing analysis is correct, 
however, the legal landscape prior to the statutes was pervaded with discretion, 
which legal actors might exploit to avoid becoming embroiled in disputes 
between foreign governments and private creditors. Indeed, this tendency exists 
even today. In the past few years, creditors have tried but failed to seize Argentine 
assets, including diplomatic property, despite a contractual waiver of immunity 
that seems to permit seizure. Courts have avoided allowing seizure of such 
sensitive assets by requiring the waiver to refer expressly to the specified assets.xx  
Despite such cases, modern law leaves courts significantly less discretion 
in deciding whether to hear a lawsuit against a foreign sovereign or to enforce the 
resulting judgment. The SIA withholds jurisdictional immunity in disputes over 
“the provision of finance” (SIA §3(3)), and the FSIA commands that a waiver of 
sovereign immunity is to be enforced “notwithstanding any withdrawal of the 
waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect” (28 U.S.C. §§ 1605). Both 
statutes likewise require the enforcement of waivers of execution immunity (SIA 
§ 13(3); FSIA § 1610(a)(1)). Developments prior to the statutes, in contrast, left 
courts with ample discretion, which they sometimes deployed to deny creditors 
access to legal enforcement rights.xxi By doing so, they undermined the credibility 
of case-law commitments to enforce waivers of sovereign immunity.  
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The FSIA and SIA as coordinating devices 
Even if we are correct thus far, there is certainly more to the story. Almost 
overnight, market practice shifted from absolute rejection of clauses waiving 
sovereign immunity to absolute acceptance. The uniformity of this shift requires 
further explanation. As noted, loan contracts have long required governments to 
cede aspects of their sovereignty. A common example from the era of absolute 
immunity involves ceding control over ports and other revenue collection points. 
But such arrangements, although common, were generally reserved for borrowers 
without strong reputations for repayment. Submitting to foreign court jurisdiction 
may be less offensive to sovereignty than ceding physical control of sovereign 
territory, but it is not a matter of indifference. Creditworthy governments 
probably could have maintained access to capital markets without agreeing to 
waive sovereign immunity. After the FSIA and SIA, however, virtually no 
government refused to provide a waiver. 
The rapidity and uniformity of the shift may reflect a fundamental need for 
coordination in the sovereign debt markets. Like most contracts for tradable 
securities, sovereign bonds are based on a template, which varies little from 
transaction to transaction. Standardization facilitates pricing and investment 
decisions by minimizing the number of variables that might affect a security’s 
value (e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 942-43 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
Standardization also results from concentration in the market for legal services. In 
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a typical sovereign bond deal, both the issuing government and the underwriters 
retain outside counsel, although the issuer chooses both sets of lawyers (Bradley 
et al. 2014). Because law firms accumulate expertise about the government’s 
financial and political affairs, governments also tend to forge lasting relationships 
with their chosen counsel, and a small group of global law firms dominate this 
market (Bradley et al. 2014). 
Market concentration, combined with the tendency for lawyers to rely on 
existing forms (Gulati and Scott 2013), means that sovereign bonds are based on a 
handful of templates. Proposals to modify these templates encounter active 
resistance, often expressed as a concern over pricing implications. For example, 
government finance officials long resisted the use of clauses designed to facilitate 
restructuring in the event of financial distress. Many expressed the concern that 
investors might misinterpret the adoption of such a clause as a signal that the 
government presented increased default risk (e.g., Gelpern and Gulati 2006). Such 
concerns would be eased if finance officials could be assured that other 
governments would also adopt the new clause. In a market-wide, coordinated 
switch, no government sends an adverse signal by following the herd. 
In part, signaling concerns may explain why governments delayed so long 
in incorporating clauses waiving sovereign immunity. A finance ministry official 
contemplating adopting such a clause might wonder how an investor would 
perceive the change. On the one hand, legal enforcement rights should improve 
42 
 
the investor’s position in the event of a default. From that perspective, the clause 
seems a welcome addition. An investor might accept lower returns in exchange 
for meaningful enforcement rights. On the other hand, sovereign loans involve 
significant information asymmetries (Flandreau et al. 2010; Choi et al. 2012; 
Bradley et al. 2014). The borrowing government has a great deal of information—
hidden to investors—about internal political and economic conditions. If it were 
to adopt an unusual clause bestowing new enforcement rights, investors might 
assume that the government presents an increased risk of default and demand a 
premium for holding the debt. Fear of this investor reaction, however unrealistic, 
might discourage government finance officials from being the first to adopt 
immunity waivers. 
There is another reason why governments might hesitate to adopt waivers 
of sovereign immunity. Government officials must justify their actions to some 
constituency. We suspect that finance officials would find it hard to justify 
revising existing contract templates to reduce the borrower’s sovereign 
prerogatives and submit it to litigation in foreign courts (e.g., Buchheit 2000, 
142). Again, however, widespread use of such clauses provides “cover,” 
normalizing the use of a clause that might otherwise be hard to justify. As a 
working hypothesis, then, we would expect government officials to agree to 
immunity waivers only if they received assurances that officials for other 
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governments would do the same. And in the concentrated sovereign debt legal 
market, lawyers are well-positioned to provide such assurances. 
For these reasons, actors involved in sovereign debt transactions have an 
interest in coordinating their behavior. Yet there remains the question of why the 
FSIA and SIA prompted a switch from one coordinated practice (not waiving 
immunity) to its opposite. On this question, a growing literature on how law can 
facilitate coordination may offer insight (e.g., McAdams 2015). One way legal 
rules induce coordination is by influencing expectations about how others will 
behave. As an example, consider the rule “drive on the right” (e.g., Schelling 
1960; McAdams 2000). A third party who expresses this rule can facilitate 
coordination even if the party has no sanctioning power or claim to legitimacy 
(McAdams 2000). Simple expression of the rule can enable coordination by 
creating the expectation that others will follow the rule.  
This is not to say that the identity of the party expressing the rule is 
irrelevant. When the party has authority as a rule-maker, its pronouncements 
should more effectively guide behavior. The same is true when a party is 
empowered to impose sanctions for violation of the rule. For these reasons, courts 
and legislatures may be especially good at facilitating coordination (e.g., Garret 
and Weingast 1993; McAdams 2005). Some actors are also effective aggregators 
of information about behavior. When such actors assert a rule, this may prompt 
observers to update their beliefs about the prevalence of desirability of a behavior. 
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For instance, a legislative prohibition on smoking in public may cause observers 
to update beliefs as to the dangers of second-hand smoke (Dharmapala and 
McAdams 2003). 
Such considerations may explain the impact of the FSIA and SIA. As 
noted, the statutes removed jurisdictional immunity and provided limited 
execution rights in cases arising out of a foreign sovereign’s commercial 
activity.xxii In addition, the statutes unequivocally allowed creditors to contract for 
more expansive rights. After these changes, a government borrower that wanted 
to maintain the status quo could not keep using the same contract template, which 
said nothing about sovereign immunity. New debt would have been subject to the 
new default rule, meaning the sovereign could expect to be sued if it defaulted in 
payment, although creditors would have limited execution rights. To approximate 
the prior status quo, the government would have to contract around the new 
default rules—for example, by negotiating a clause requiring investors to bring 
suit exclusively in the borrower’s own courts. Governments could, of course, keep 
using existing contract templates. In that event, investors would have enjoyed the 
new enforcement rights created by the FSIA and SIA but would also have been 
subject to the limits those statutes imposed. So why did governments revise the 
template to bestow additional rights, such as broader rights to execute a judgment 
against sovereign assets?xxiii 
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If we are correct that the statutes represented the first credible 
commitments to enforce sovereign immunity waivers, then part of the answer is 
surely that lawyers had previously seen little point in drafting such clauses. A 
more complete explanation, however, begins by noting that the statutes made 
legal enforcement rights especially salient to lawyers (Weidemaier 2014). The 
FSIA and SIA were prominent topics of discussion and provoked public debate 
about the rules appropriate for sovereign debt cases (e.g., Delaume 1973). It 
would have been impossible for the relatively small group of lawyers involved in 
sovereign bond transactions not to consider the impact of new sovereign 
immunity rules on bond documentation. And because sovereign immunity 
waivers were now unequivocally enforceable, it would have been difficult to 
justify omitting such a clause given the (relatively) creditor-friendly new default 
rule. Moreover, given the concentrated legal market, lawyers are exceptionally 
good aggregators of information. This would have allowed them to credibly 
represent to government finance officials that clauses waiving sovereign 
immunity were the new market standard, thus mitigating concerns that would 
normally deter officials from agreeing to such a clause. 
To conclude, a number of factors likely explain why the FSIA and SIA 
had such a dramatic impact on bond contracts. As credible commitments to 
enforce immunity waivers, the statutes arguably represented a significant change 
from prior law. By changing the default rule to provide creditors with limited 
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enforcement rights, the statutes made it difficult for government borrowers to 
bargain for a return to the status quo. By increasing the salience of legal 
enforcement, the statutes made it difficult for lawyers to ignore sovereign 
immunity when documenting a bond issue. And because of the concentrated 
nature of this legal market, lawyers were well-positioned to overcome the natural 
reluctance among finance officials to expose their governments to litigation in 
foreign courts. Thus, we do not argue that statutory developments necessarily 
have a more pronounced impact on behavior than judicial developments. We 
argue only that, in this context, it should not be surprising that the FSIA and SIA 
had such a dramatic impact on market practice, whereas prior developments had 
none. 
CIL AND THE SEARCH FOR STATE PRACTICE 
In this final section, we return to our starting point: the topic of customary 
international law, defined as “general practice accepted as law” (ICJ Statute, art. 
38). The definition incorporates two elements. The first is state practice. When 
there is a general and consistent practice of states, these “international behavioral 
regularities” (Goldsmith and Posner 1999, 1116) can crystallize into a binding 
legal rule. This occurs, however, only if states view the practice as obligatory 
(e.g., Guzman 2006). This second element—the belief that the practice is legally 
required—is called opinio juris. 
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We are particularly interested in the state practice requirement, and 
especially in the methodological difficulties posed by the need to identify (and 
aggregate) the practices of nearly 200 states. An extensive body of international 
law scholarship explores the difficulties posed by the state practice requirement. 
For instance, CIL rules ostensibly emerge only when state practice is “uniform, 
extensive, and representative” (International Law Association 2000). Yet this does 
not mean the practice must be universal (e.g., Brownlie 2008; Trimble 1986). 
Indeed, CIL rules can arise even if affected states sometimes act inconsistently with 
the purported rule. This begs the question of how much inconsistency will be 
tolerated, and here opinions diverge (e.g., Guzman 2006). Similar uncertainty 
plagues the question of how much time must pass before state practice crystallizes 
into CIL (e.g., D’Amato 1971). 
These and other doctrinal uncertainties have prompted criticism of CIL 
(e.g., D’Amato 1968; Trimble 1986; Goldsmith and Posner 1999; Kelly 2000). But 
despite its critics, CIL remains a vital source of international law, one that binds 
even dissenting states in most cases.xxiv And the state practice element—to which 
our project speaks most directly—remains a central component of CIL analysis. 
Because CIL rules develop from state practice, students and practitioners of 
international law must learn how to identify the practices that matter. 
Most lists of relevant practices include national legislation, decisions of 
international and national tribunals, executive orders, diplomatic correspondence, 
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opinions by official legal advisors, and treaty commitments (e.g., Verdier and 
Voeten 2015; Kelly 2000). Reaching beyond these core state practices, a more 
inclusive list might include: 
diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the 
opinions of government legal advisers, official manuals on legal 
questions (e.g. manuals of military law), executive decisions and 
practices, orders to military forces (e.g. rules of engagement), 
comments by governments on ILC drafts and accompanying 
commentary, legislation, international and national judicial 
decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments 
(especially when in ‘all states’ form), an extensive pattern of treaties 
in the same terms, the practice of international organs, and 
resolutions relating to legal questions in UN organs, notably the 
General Assembly (Brownlie 2008, 24).  
It should go without saying that this inquiry raises potent methodological 
difficulties. As Guzman (2006, 126) puts it: 
[I]t is fantastical to think that lawyers in a case, much less 
adjudicators deciding a case or policymakers selecting a course of 
action, can canvass the virtually infinite universe of potential 
evidence, let alone come to some understanding of the extent to 
which a practice has been followed. 
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Such criticisms imply a danger inherent in the state practice requirement: Without 
the ability (and perhaps the inclination) to identify state practices, there a risk that 
international tribunals and scholars will allow normative preferences to trump 
actual state assent (e.g., Weisburd 2015). 
Our project lends some credence to this skeptical view, under which 
international tribunals and scholars cannot or will not comb through all relevant 
evidence of state practice. Indeed, one implication of our findings is that matters 
may be worse than they seem. Even critics of the state practice requirement 
largely focus on traditional legal materials—i.e., formal statements of the law by 
authorized government agents. It is true that such materials provide important 
evidence of state practice. But it is also true that the law on the books can paint an 
incomplete, and even misleading, picture, however extensively researchers 
canvass it.  
This paper has focused on a particular example of state practice: that of 
giving effect to a waiver of sovereign immunity in a private creditor’s contract 
with a foreign government. By reading cases and other traditional legal materials, 
prominent authorities writing in the early and mid-1900s concluded that the 
general practice was to enforce such waivers, with the United Kingdom as 
perhaps the only clear exception. They apparently did not think to ask whether 
these judicial developments represented credible commitments to respect 
immunity waivers in the future. This is not because the question is unimportant. 
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As a doctrinal matter, it is clear that “cheap talk” merits little weight in the state 
practice inquiry (e.g., International Law Association 2000, 13-14). The problem is 
that one must look beyond the law on the books to distinguish credible from non-
credible assertions of state practice. 
Having made such an inquiry, we are skeptical of the view that sovereign 
immunity was a default rule until the latter part of the twentieth century. Of 
course, we do not deny the existence of judicial opinions declaring that sovereign 
immunity could be waived. We argue only that investor and governments likely 
viewed these as outlier cases that did not create a legal regime in which waivers 
would predictably be enforced. With regard to French law, for example, recall 
that not one of the bonds in our sample included a waiver of immunity despite the 
ostensibly clear rule giving effect to such clauses. This implies that investors had 
serious doubts that French courts would enforce immunity waivers. The historical 
evidence indicates that investors were more than willing to use the courts during 
the period of absolute immunity, if the courts was willing to take the case. So the 
answer does not seem to be that investors were indifferent to legal enforcement. 
The competing explanation—that investors interpreted French courts as reluctant 
to assume jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns—suggests that legal experts may 
have assigned too much significance to the early French cases.  
The point is that even the most diligent inquiry into state practice will be 
incomplete if it considers only traditional legal materials. When considering 
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whether a judicial opinion, statute, or other formal statement of the law 
establishes state practice, it is appropriate to ask whether directly affected parties 
change their behavior in response. If this does not happen, we do not suggest that 
the statement must automatically be dismissed as cheap talk. (After all, a key 
insight in socio-legal studies is that parties do not always structure their affairs 
around the law on the books.) Nevertheless, the red flag is up. When a 
government agent’s act has no effect on behavior, this cautions against assigning 
the act significant weight as evidence of state practice. 
A pessimistic response to our argument is to say that we propose to make 
the state practice requirement entirely unworkable. If CIL scholarship and 
practice already fails to take adequate account of the law on the books, what hope 
is there that jurists and scholars will undertake extensive empirical studies of 
market practice? But we do not suggest that international tribunals should (or 
could) commission multiple empirical studies before ruling on contested matters. 
Instead, we advocate only for a more skeptical conception of the law on the 
books—one that treats official proclamations of the law as hypotheses about state 
practice, which should be tested by looking to other evidence when it is available. 
In a sense, then, we call only for a more robustly empirical conception of 
customary international law (e.g., Shaffer and Ginsburg 2012). 
A more robust conception of state practice, one that takes into account a 
wider range of empirical evidence, will not always yield easy answers. Indeed, 
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such an approach will often complicate traditional conceptions of CIL rules. In a 
sense, then, one risk of expanding the focus beyond traditional legal materials is 
that this will reveal the limits of the very concept of state “practice.” We have 
little doubt that detailed empirical examination will often reveal state practices to 
vary in credibility, consistency, and generality. Where it exists, such variance 
makes the notion of state practice little more than an intellectual construct.  
In other cases, however, a more robust empirical approach to identifying 
state practice will clarify rather than complicate the law on the books. Previously, 
for example, we discussed the uncertainty over whether pre-FSIA law in the U.S. 
treated waivers of sovereign immunity as irrevocable. Our inquiry into 
government bonds can help resolve this uncertainty. Recall that virtually all pre-
FSIA government bonds issued in the U.S. market omitted waivers of immunity. 
Because investors had reason to value the option to sue a sovereign that did not 
pay its debts, the likely explanation is that investors doubted the willingness of 
U.S. courts (and the Department of State) to enforce such clauses. 
Another benefit of looking beyond traditional legal materials is that such 
an inquiry can help assess the relative significance of legal developments. Recall 
that conventional wisdom about the evolution of sovereign immunity law assigns 
relatively little significance to the FSIA and SIA. Yet when these statutes are 
judged by their impact on market practice, our data reveal them to be the most 
significant legal developments in the two-century history of the sovereign debt 
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markets. The statutes transformed a global market and prompted market 
participants, for the first time, to incorporate legal enforcement rights into the 
contract template. By focusing only on the law on the books, traditional analyses 
have completely overlooked this radical transformation.  
CONCLUSION 
We began this project after noting a disjuncture in how our academic 
colleagues in the field of international law and our practitioner colleagues in the 
field of international finance understand the law of sovereign immunity. Most 
international law scholars describe a gradual, century-plus transition between two 
default rules. They understand sovereign immunity as a default rule and the 
absolute immunity regime as a baseline presumption of immunity that could be 
trumped by contract. By contrast, the practitioners appear to understand legal 
enforcement as a modern development, something that became possible only in 
the latter part of the 20th century. 
As scholars who study the design and evolution of contracts, we believe 
that market practices can shed light on this disagreement. If contracts are drafted 
in the shadow of legal rules, then these conflicting understandings of sovereign 
immunity law imply different predictions about contract design. If the law 
gradually shifted between default rules—from a presumption of immunity to a 
presumption of non-immunity—then waivers of immunity should have been fairly 
common during the era of absolute immunity, when a creditor who had not 
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obtained such a waiver would have no legal recourse. By contrast, if legal 
enforcement did not become relevant until late in the 20th century, then contracts 
drafted earlier in the century should largely ignore the subject. 
Our data largely support the practitioner view and imply that market 
participants viewed sovereign immunity as akin to a mandatory rule for much of 
the century. But the dramatic shift in contracting practices prompted by the FSIA 
and SIA calls for further explanation, as we can think of few legal changes that 
have had such a transformative impact on contract design. When market 
participants have strong incentives to coordinate, salient statutory enactments may 
shape behavior far more than other developments in the law.  
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i Statute of the Int’l Court of Justice art. 38, Apr. 18, 1946. 
ii More precisely, because we view the distinction between mandatory and 
default rules as a continuum rather than a binary, we would place the doctrine of 
absolute immunity towards the mandatory end. 
iii The case even involved debt arising out of sovereign bonds, although 
our data will show that waivers of this sort were extraordinarily rare. 
iv The authors of the Harvard Project acknowledged that their draft 
convention was not merely descriptive (1932, 474), but the authors clearly viewed 
the waiver rule as consistent with international custom.  
v Section 13(4) authorizes execution (again, subject to certain conditions) 
on property “in use or intended for use for commercial purposes,” while section 
13(3) allows “the giving of any relief or the issue of any process with the written 
consent of the State concerned.” 
vi Accounts differ as to when France adopted restrictive immunity. The 
Snow Report (1949) identified the date as 1929; more recent scholarship puts it at 
1969 (Verdier and Voeten 2014, 12). The difference does not matter for our 
purposes, especially as it remained unclear whether issuing bonds was a 
commercial act (e.g., Badr 1984, 57-59). For convenience, we adopt 1929. 
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vii The economic literature emphasizes weak legal enforcement as a central 
problem in the sovereign debt markets (e.g., Aguiar and Amador 2014; Panizza, et 
al. 2009). Yet if sovereign immunity were a default rule, creditors could have 
bargained for greater enforcement rights—not only the right to sue, but the right 
to seize assets found outside the sovereign’s own borders.  
viii The count excludes bonds issued by sub-sovereign entities, such as 
development banks and cities; bonds issued by international organizations created 
by treaty, such as the European Coal and Steel Community; and bonds issued in 
local markets, where the borrower’s citizens historically comprised a much 
greater proportion of the investor base. 
ix We counted a bond as issued in Paris if it was listed on the Paris Bourse, 
if coupon or principal payments were made in France, if the bond was payable in 
French francs, or if the bond or related sales documents were written in French. In 
any of these cases, it is likely that French citizens would have comprised a 
substantial part of the investor base.  
x Prospectus for the Republic of Finland, $50,000,000 8.75% Bonds Due 
1992 (Oct. 19, 1977). 
xi For example: “To the extent that the Republic may in any jurisdiction 
claim for itself or its assets or its revenues immunity from suit, execution, 
attachment... the Republic agrees not to claim and irrevocably waives such 
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immunity to the fullest extent permitted by the laws of such jurisdiction” 
(Republic of Hungary, Offering Circular for 4.5% Notes due 2013, p. 11). 
xii The figure reports the data by issue rather than by issuer; thus, certain 
countries are over-represented. But reporting the data by issuer does not alter the 
findings. 
xiii The first draft of the legislation that became the FSIA was introduced 
with the joint support of the Department of State and the Department of Justice in 
January 1973. 
xiv To our knowledge, these direct loan contracts are not available to 
researchers. We have tried to track them down and have failed. Because they were 
private documents, they also would not have been available to Delaume, although 
he may have obtained some through informal channels.  
xv Lawyers familiar with sovereign debt practices in the 1970s corroborate 
Delaume’s claims in that decade (Wood 2010, 14). For prior decades, however, 
we are skeptical. Our data often contradict Delaume’s assertions about “routine” 
practice. For example, Delaume asserted that, by the 1960s, sovereign bonds 
issued in continental Europe routinely included immunity waivers (1967, 174). 
Although we do not have a large sample of such bonds, those we do have mirror 
bonds issued in New York and London. For example, bonds listed on the 
Frankfurt exchange in 1968 by South Africa do not include a waiver of sovereign 
immunity, nor do Liberian bonds issued in Paris in 1963. And we have dozens of 
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bonds issued in European markets between 1900-1950, none of which includes a 
clause submitting to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. 
xvi The arbitration clauses appear in the so-called League Loans—post-
WWI reconstruction loans arranged under the auspices of the League of Nations 
(e.g., Myers 1945)—or in loans based on that contract template. 
xvii Historically, creditor countries have been ambivalent about protecting 
their citizens’ investments in foreign government bonds (e.g., Lipson 1985). Yet 
when consistent with broader geopolitical interests, governments have played a 
much more active role, as with U.S. “dollar diplomacy” in Latin America in the 
first decades of the twentieth-century (e.g., Rosenberg 1999; Maurer 2013).  
xviii In earlier work, we found that over 40 percent of bonds issued before 
World War II included such revenue “earmarks” (e.g., Weidemaier, Scott, and 
Gulati 2013). 
xix Whytock and Chilton (2015) present evidence that the FSIA may have 
exacerbated this dynamic by transferring immunity determinations to the courts, 
although they agree that the Department “was perceived to be politicized and 
inconsistent” (p. 427).  
xx Société NML Capital Ltd. v. Republique Argentine, Cour de Cassation 
(1ère Chambre Civile), No. 09-72.057 (Sept. 28, 2011); Société NML Capital 
(Iles Caїmans) v. Etat d’Argentine, Cour de Cassation (1ère Chambre Civile), No. 
10-25.938, 11-10.450 and 11-13.323 (Mar. 28, 2013)). The waiver provides that 
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“[t]o the extent the Republic or any of its [assets] … shall be entitled, in any 
jurisdiction … to any immunity … from execution … the Republic … has 
irrevocably waived such immunity to the fullest extent permitted by the laws of 
such jurisdiction.” (Form of Security attached to 1994 Fiscal Agency Agreement, 
p. A-17). In a recent case, another French court appears to have allowed seizure 
notwithstanding the lack of an express reference to diplomatic assets.  
xxi Our data are also consistent with the view (e.g., Coyle 2015) that U.S. 
courts are more willing to embrace principles of international law when 
incorporated into domestic statutes. For the reasons discussed in the text, we are 
skeptical that there was a general practice among states of enforcing waivers of 
sovereign immunity. Yet even if there had been such a practice, statutory 
enactment might have been necessary to prompt U.S. courts to embrace the rule.  
xxii The FSIA left unclear whether the issuance of debt was a commercial 
act for which a sovereign lost jurisdictional immunity, but the legislative history 
implied that the answer was “yes” (Weidemaier 2014). 
xxiii For example, the FSIA’s default rule denies execution immunity only 
for assets “used for a commercial activity” in the U.S. and “used for the 
commercial activity upon which the claim is based” (28 U.S.C. § 1610). This 
latter (“nexus”) requirement dramatically limits a creditor’s right to execute a 




                                                                                                                                
xxiv The inability to opt out of CIL rules is subject to criticism, especially 
as treaties often provide unilateral opt out rights (Bradley and Gulati 2010). 
